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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The SujiK'iiiiii1 i HI " i in ii uli. 'ii .il in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2 
2|"3){j) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
rented for review is whether the Distrcit Court erred, as a matter 
*r folding that a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee's re|miiM I I*"! I»»i'« pxeruinry 
nniii.ici, fiuiMiiini In !;, United States Bankruptcy Code, results in llit1 
termination of all future rights and obligations of the debtor and noii-ddilui inii 
This issue was decided strictly as a matter of law. Therefore the district 
court's ruling is entitletl li mt iieleienui .mil lli't" hsur iituM be decided independently 
on appeal. Transamerica Cash Resreve, Inc. v. Dixie Power & Water, Inc., !H9 V,1J 11 
(Utah 1990). 
S T A T U T O R Y PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions that are determinative 
11 U.S.C. § 365(a): 
Except as provided in sections 765 and 766 of this title and in 
subsections (b)(c), and (d) of this section, the trustee, subject to the 
court's approvial, may assume or reject any executory contract or 
unexpired lease of the debtor. 
11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1): 
In a case under chapter 7 of this title, if the trustee does not assume 
or reject an executory contract or unexpired lease of residential real 
property or of personal property of the debtor within 60 days after 
the order for relief, or within such additional time as the court, for 
cause, within such 60-day period, fixes, then such contract or lease is 
deemed rejected. 
11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1): 
Except as provided in subsection (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section, the 
rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor 
constitutes a breach of such contract or lease- if such contract or 
lease has not been assumed under this section or under a plan 
confirmed under chapter 9, 11, 12 or 13 of this title, immediately 
before the date of the filing of the petition. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On April 20, 1990, H. LeRoy Cobabe, Plaintiff and Appellant ("Cobabe") filed 
an action in the Fifth Judicial Distrcit Court against Garth and Edward Stanger, 
Defendants and Appellees ("Stangers"). The Complaint sought the enforcement of an 
Agreement for Consulting Services (the "Agreement" or "Contract") dated April 26, 
1988. There being no dispute as to material facts, Cobabe filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on August 31, 1990 and Stangers subsequently filed a Cross-Motion for 
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Sininiiiemu ioth Motions were heard by the Honorable Philip J, Eves on 
Octobei 18, 1990. Judge Eves took the matter under adviseQR I • 
Memoranduii Vlotion for Summarv Judgment anv denying 
Cobabe's Motion for Summary Judgment, A copy of the Memorandum Dec ISM MI is 
attached as Appena < '.ecibiun was based solely upon his 
interpretation •** h ^ • " uv* United States Bankruptcy ^ d e . A n Uidei Granting 
Defendants' .I^LUU \ the Complaint was entered 
, J ( 'ohabe then filed the instant appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I i i, ib i I i i , nl ?ft, VMK H. Leroy Cobabe ("Cobabe") and Garth 
Stanger and Edward Stanger ("Stangers") entered into an Agreenieiil lui1 l ""! iMMiif.' 
Services .. .v.* - * isxanh 3 (Record at p MI 
*,. Pursuant i ,: Agret-men* Cobabe agreed to perform consulting and 
advisory ser^Vec o„ ,. .. Hitters relating to or affecting' 
Stangers* acquisition of a dealer agreement with Toyota Motor Distributors, Tnc. and 
Stangers* operation of a car dealership . ^cement 
was attached to Plaintiffs Complaint and was also produced pursuant to Plaintiffs 
Response to Defendants' First Request for Admissions, i"li!< i "^jit'tii^ i i for 
Pun I m in HI <il I KM mini in,,, /" i copy of the Agreement is attached as Appendix "A" to 
this Brief. 
, . -3-
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3. Also pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Stangers agreed to pay 
$10,000.00 upon the execution of the Agreement, $4,000.00 a month beginning May 1, 
1988 and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter until September 1, 1988, 
at which time Stangers agreed to pay the sum of $13,000.00. Then, beginning on 
October 1, 1988, and on the first day of each month thereafter, Stangers agreed to pay 
Cobabe the sum of $4,000.00 until May 31, 1991, at which time the Agreement was to 
terminate. See Appendix "A". 
4. Stangers paid the amounts as required by the terms of the contract up to 
and including the monthly payment for October 1, 1989. See Plaintiffs Affidavit, 
paragraph 2 (Record at p. 36). 
5. On November 1, 1989, Cobabe filed a voluntary petition pursuant to 
Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. See Plaintiffs Reply to 
Counterclaim, paragraph 2 (Record at p. 30). 
6. Just prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition, a judgment creditor of 
Cobabe, Celia R. Snow ("Snow"), served Stangers with a Writ of Garnishment in an 
attempt to attach amounts owing to Cobabe under the Agreement The Writ of 
Garnishment was served on October 15, 1989, after the October 1 payment had been 
made but before the November 1 payment was due. See Plaintiffs Affidavit, paragraph 
3 (Record at p. 37), 
7. When Cobabe made demand upon Stangers for the November 1, 1989 
payment, Stangers refused to pay citing the Snow Writ of Garnishment. See Plaintiffs 
Affidavit, paragraph 4 (Record at p. 37). 
.4-
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8. Because of Stangers' refusal to pay, Cobabe was forced to file a Motion 
for Order Determining Validity of Garnishment with the Bankruptcy Court on 
December 14, 1989, seeking an order of the court determining that the Snow Writ of 
Garnishment was invalid as to post-petition earnings of Cobabe and that the post-
petition earnings of Cobabe under the Agreement were not property of the bankruptcy 
estate but were the property of Cobabe personally and that he was entitled to receive 
the same. See Exhibit "B" to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Record at p. 61). 
9. A hearing on the Motion was scheduled for December 21, 1989 and a 
Notice of Hearing was given to Snow and Stangers on December 14, 1989. See Exhibits 
"C" and "D" to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment (Record at p. 68 & 69). 
10. Prior to the hearing, a Stipulation Regarding Writ of Garnishment was 
entered into between Cobabe and Snow whereby the parties agreed that the Writ had 
no force and effect as to Cobabe's post-petition earnings. An order of the court 
approving the stipulation was entered on December 21, 1989. See Exhibits "Eft and "F" 
to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment (record at p. 71 and 73). 
11. Stangers failed to appear at the hearing before the Bankruptcy Court on 
December 21, 1989. Based upon the proffer of evidence, the court found that amounts 
owed by Stangers to Cobabe on or after November 1, 1989 were not property of the 
bankruptcy estate but were instead post-petition earnings belonging to Cobabe in his 
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individual capacity. Based upon these findings, the court ordered Stangers to 
immediately pay over to Cobabe the funds representing post-petition earnings that were 
being held by Stangers. A copy of the proposed order was mailed to Stangers on 
December 21, 1989, and no objection to the form of the order having been filed, the 
court entered the order on January 5, 1990. See Exhibit "G" to Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Record at p. 
75). 
12. A copy of the conformed order was sent to Stangers by the clerk of the 
court on January 5, 1990. However, Stangers ignored the order and refused to pay over 
to Cobabe those amounts ordered by the court After repeated demands made 
personally by Cobabe, the Stangers continued to refuse to make payment and Cobabe 
was forced to file a Motion for Order to Show Cause with supporting affidavit. See 
plaintiffs Affidavit, paragraphs 7 and 8 (Record at p. 37 and 38). Based upon these 
pleadings, Judge Boulden issued an Order to Show Cause ordering Stangers to appear 
on February 1, 1990 and show cause why they should not be held in contempt for 
failure to obey the court's order of January 5, 1990. See Exhibits "H", "I" and "J" to 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Record at p. 79, 82 and 84). 
13. At the hearing on February 1, 1990, the court heard testimony from both 
Cobabe and Stangers. After considering the pleadings, the evidence and the arguments 
of counsel, the court entered an order finding that the conduct of Stangers constituted 
willful failure to abide by the court's previous order and ordered that Stangers 
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immediately pay to Cobabe, within 24 hours of the order, all amounts due and owing 
which represented post-petition earnings. Said order was entered February 2, 1990. See 
Exhibit "K" to Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment (Record at p. 86). 
14. Subsequently, Stangers filed a Motion to Stay Enforcement of Ruling on 
Contempt This Motion was denied, although the court modified its prior order by 
ordering that Stangers pay the funds to Cobabe's counsel, who was to hold the funds for 
a period of five days to allow the bankruptcy trustee an opportunity to assert an interest 
in the funds if he determined that it was appropriate to do so. See Exhibit "L" to 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Record at p. 90). 
15. Pursuant to the February 2, 1990 order, Stangers paid to Cobabe's counsel 
the sum of $20,300.00, representing monthly payments for November, December, 
January and February, plus attorneys' fees of $300.00 as required by the Order. The 
trustee never asserted any interest in the funds and the funds were disbursed to Cobabe. 
See Plaintiffs Reply to Counterclaim, paragraph 5 and Plaintiffs Affidavit, paragraph 9 
(Record at p. 31 and 38). 
16. Stangers subsequently filed a Motion For Relief from Order and a 
supporting Memorandum, seeking to set aside the Bankruptcy Court's previous orders. 
While contesting the Stangers' Motion, Cobabe agreed that the state court would be an 
appropriate forum in which to resolve the dispute between the parties and on that basis 
alone agreed that the January 5, 1990 order could be vacated. See Exhibit "M" to 
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Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Record at p. 96). 
17. Cobabe then filed this case in the Fifth Judicial District Court and 
Stangers raised as an Affirmative Defense the fact that Cobabe's bankruptcy trustee 
rejected the contract. See Answer and Counterclaim (Record at p. 11). 
18. During the term of the Agreement, Cobabe at all times performed 
according to the Agreement and was not in breach of the Agreement, either before or 
after his bankruptcy filing. See Plaintiffs Affidavit, paragraph 10 (Record at p. 38). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The validity of the Agreement between Cobabe and Stangers is not affected by 
Cobabe's bankruptcy filing nor by the Chapter 7 Trustee's rejection of the Agreement. 
The trustee's rejection simply means that the Contract will not become part of the 
bankruptcy estate because the trustee has determined that it will not benefit the estate. 
Section 365(g)(1) provides that a rejection of an executory contract constitutes 
a breach of the contract as of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The rejection does 
not terminate the contract but only creates the fiction that the contract was breached as 
of the filing date in order to allow the non-debtor party to the contract to assert a claim 
against the bankruptcy estate. 
The Bankruptcy Code does not allow a trustee to repudiate contracts. If an 
executory contract was valid and enforceable the day before a bankruptcy filing, it 
cm\071591 
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continues to be enforceable, notwithstanding the trustee's rejection of the contract, so 
long as the debtor performs according to the terms of the contract. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE AGREEMENT FOR CONSULTING SERVICES BETWEEN COBABE 
AND STANGERS CONTINUES TO BE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE REJECTION OF THE AGREEMENT BY 
COBABE'S CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE. 
As described in the facts set forth above, Cobabe has been trying for almost 
two years to enforce the Consulting Agreement For months Stangers ignored the 
bankruptcy process and Court Orders until found in contempt and ordered to perform 
their obligations under the Agreement. At no time during the bankruptcy proceeding 
did Stangers assert § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq.) as a defense 
to Cobabe's efforts to enforce the Agreement. (All subsequent statutory references are 
to the United States Bankruptcy Code unless otherwise noted.) When Cobabe 
commenced the instant action in Fifth District Court, Stangers resisted Cobabe's efforts 
to collect by asserting a bankruptcy defense. Stangers asserted that because Cobabe's 
Chapter 7 trustee rejected the Consulting Agreement, the entire Agreement was 
terminated. Section 365 codifies the rights and obligations as between a trustee in 
bankruptcy and the non-debtor party to an executory contract or unexpired lease and 
allows the trustee to either assume or reject an executory contract of the debtor. 
cm\071591 
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However, the section does not alter the rights and obligations as between the debtor 
and the non-debtor party to the contract.1 
A. A CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE'S REJECTION OF THE DEBTOR'S 
EXECUTORY CONTRACT DOES NOT TERMINATE THE CONTRACT. 
To better understand the purpose and workings of § 365, it is helpful to have 
an overview of bankruptcy law. The basic premise of bankruptcy law involves the 
collection of the debtor's property by a disinterested third person who will administer it 
for the benefit of all creditors. The current Bankruptcy Code accomplishes this transfer 
by the creation of an estate upon the filing of a petition by or against the debtor. § 541. 
A trustee is then appointed to administer the assets of the estate by collecting and 
liquidating all property in which the debtor has an interest, unless the property is of 
inconsequential value or burdensome to the estate. §§ 554 and 701. 
Creditors who have a right to payment from the debtor as of the date of the 
bankruptcy filing are entitled to a distributive share of the estate. The estate may have 
its own creditors as well; obligations or expenses incurred in the administration of the 
estate. These creditors are entitled to an administrative claim which carries with it a 
priority of payment ahead of the debtor's general creditors. Because the debtor's 
1The parties agree that the subject Consulting Agreement is 
an executory contract wiwthin the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. 
A generally accepted definition of an executory contract is one 
where the obligations of both parties are so far unperformed that 
the failure of either to complete performance would constitute a 
material brach excusing performance of the other. 
cm\071591 
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personal liability is discharged in the bankruptcy process, any creditor's recovery is 
limited to a share of the distribution from the estate. 
Within this scheme of bankruptcy administration, executory contracts have 
historically received unique treatment. Executory contracts pose a special problem to a 
bankruptcy trustee because they embody both an asset-the non-debtor's performance to 
be rendered, and a liability—the debtor's obligations under the contract. The 
Bankruptcy Code provides that the trustee may assume or reject any executory contract 
of the debtor. § 365(a). This ability to pick and choose is necessary in order to protect 
the estate from becoming burdened with additional liability. If the executory contract 
automatically passed into the estate in the same manner as all other property of the 
debtor, the estate would acquire an asset-the right to performance from the non-
debtor party, but it would also become liable for the corresponding performance 
originally due from the debtor. Accordingly, the trustee is given the option to assume 
or not assume an executory contract depending upon which course of action will result 
in benefit to the estate. 
The source of current executory contract doctrine is largely an English case, 
Copeland v. Stephens. 106 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1818). Copeland, a lessor of real 
property sued to recover rent from Stephens, an assignee of Copeland's original lessee. 
Stephens had gone into bankruptcy before the rent became due and argued that the 
leasehold interest had passed to his bankruptcy trustee. 
The court concluded that the general bankruptcy assignment [for the benefit 
of creditors] "does not vest a term of years in the [bankruptcy] assignees, unless they do 
-11-
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some act to manifest their assent to the assignment as it regards the term, and their 
acceptance of the [leasehold] estate." Id at 222. 
The court held that the bankruptcy estate should be protected from the 
continuing liabilities of the debtor that would accompany a leasehold interest into the 
estate, unless the trustee specifically assented to the lease, as he might if the terms were 
favorable and outweighed the liabilities. The trustee therefore had the right to "assume 
or refuse" the lease. The debtor's interest in the lease never passed to the trustee 
because the trustee did not take any kind of affirmative action. 
This principle was adopted by courts of the United States, including the 
United States Supreme Court in United States Trust Co. v. Wabash W. Rv.. 150 U.S. 
287 (1893): 
The general rule applicable to this class of cases is undisputed that 
an assignee or receiver is not bound to adopt the contracts, accept 
the leases, or otherwise step into the shoes of his assignor, if in his 
opinion it would be unprofitable or undesirable to do so; and he is 
entitled to a reasonable time to elect whether to adopt or repudiate 
such contracts. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals described the application of the law as 
follows: 
The "effect [of an adjudication in bankruptcy] is to transfer to the trustee all 
the property of the bankrupt except his executory contracts, and to vest in the trustee 
the option to assume or to renounce these," but it "neither releases not absolves the 
cm\071591 
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debtor from any of his contracts or obligations." Watson v. Merrill 136 F. 359 (8th Cir. 
1905). The Court further observed: 
"Nor are those who contract with [the debtor] absolved from their 
obligations. If he or his trustee pays the stipulated rents for his 
place of residence or for his place of business, the lessors may not 
deny to the payor the use of the premises according to the terms of 
the lease." Id. at 363. 
In reviewing these principles, it becomes obvious that the defendants have 
misunderstood and are attempting to misapply the law regarding executory contracts. 
The confusion seems to stem from the use of the word "reject" in the statute. As 
previously discussed, the Bankruptcy Code gives to the trustee the option to assume or 
reject an executory contract. And, in a Chapter 7 case, if the trustee does not assume 
the contract within 60 days of the entry of the order for relief, the contract is deemed 
rejected. § 365(d)(1). But a rejection by the trustee, either by direct action or by 
operation of law, does not terminate the contract. 
To "reject" a contract is simply an election by the trustee, either expressly or 
by inaction, to leave matters as they are. The trustee, by rejecting, declines the contract 
as an asset of the estate and prevents the estate from becoming obligated pursuant to 
the terms of the contract The debtor's obligations are unaffected. 
B. A CHAPTER 7 TRUSTEE'S REJECTION OF THE DEBTOR'S 
EXECUTORY CONTRACT CONSTITUTES A BREACH OF THE 
CONTRACT ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE NON-
DEBTOR PARTY TO THE CONTRACT TO ASSERT A CLAIM 
AGAINST THE ESTATE. 
cm\071591 
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The defendants have relied upon the language of §365(g)(l) which provides 
that the rejection of an executory contract constitutes a breach of such contract as of 
the date of the petition. The linking of the word "rejection" and "breach" in this context 
has engendered much confusion, but can be understood by again analyzing the purpose 
and history of the bankruptcy laws. 
As mentioned above, historically, only those creditors with claims against the 
debtor, as of the date of the petition, could assert a claim against the bankruptcy estate. 
And the purpose of the "assume or refuse" doctrine of executory contracts was to 
protect the estate from having to assume obligations on a contract or lease where there 
were no corresponding benefits to the estate. 
However, this doctrine which protected the estate did not always adequately 
protect the non-debtor party to the contract. If the debtor was not in default at the 
time of the bankruptcy petition, the non-debtor party to the contract had no claim for 
damages against the debtor and therefor no claim against the estate. If the trustee 
subsequently decided not to assume the contract, there would be no administrative 
claim against the estate because the estate had no obligation under the contract And if 
the debtor then breached the contract post-petition, the non-debtor party had no 
recourse against the debtor because the debtor received a discharge of his personal 
liability.2 
2If the debtor had already breached the contract at the time 
of the filing, the non-debtor party would then be entitled to 
assert a claim against the estate. Even though the trustee 
subsequently rejects the contract, it is still deemed a breach of 
the contract as of the date of filing for purposes of asserting a 
cm\071591 
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A creditor in this position was left with no remedy. To ameliorate this 
situation, the courts created the fiction that upon the filing of the petition, it would be 
assumed that the debtor would not perform under the terms of the contract. Thus, if in 
fact, the debtor failed to perform post-petition, the other party to the contract was 
entitled to a claim against the estate as a general unsecured creditor, as of the date of 
the filing of the petition, notwithstanding the fact that the actual breach may have 
occurred sometime later. If the trustee assumed the contract during the pendency of 
the bankruptcy, the estate itself became obligated to perform under the contract. In 
that case, the non-debtor party would not have a claim for non-performance but would 
be entitled to a contractual performance from the trustee. However, unless and until 
the trustee assumed the contract, the debtor still retained his rights under the contract 
and his ability to perform as well as demand performance. 
The current Bankruptcy Code has incorporated this concept in § 365(g)(1) by 
providing that upon the trustee's determination that rejection of an executory contract is 
in the best interest of the estate, such rejection will relate back to the date of the 
bankruptcy filing and will be deemed a breach as of that time for purposes of allowing 
the non-debtor party to the contract to assert a claim against the estate. It must be 
emphasized that a rejection pursuant to §365 does not mean that the contract itself is 
claim. S 365(g)(1) clarifies the timing of the breach in order 
that the rejection not be construed as a post-petition breach 
which would result in a priority claim. Instead, the damage 
resulting from the breach is treated as a general unsecured 
claim. In the instant case, there is no dispute that Cobabe at 
all times complied with the terms of the Agreement and that 
Cobabe was not in breach of the Agreemenet at the time of his 
bankruptcy filing. 
cm\071591 
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rejected or repudiated. It means that the trustee will not assume the debtor's obligation 
to perform and that the non-debtor party to the contract can treat the contract as 
breached for purposes of asserting a claim against the estate. 
Take, for example, a debtor who is obligated to produce and sell widgets 
under an executory contract. At the time of the bankruptcy filing, the debtor is current 
with its contractual obligations. After the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the trustee 
of the debtor's estate determines that the contract holds no benefit for the estate and 
therefore he rejects it. Subsequently, the debtor is unable to perform. In such a case, 
the other party to the contract is entitled to a claim for damages which can be asserted 
against the bankruptcy estate. The right to damages does not arise because the trustee 
rejected the contract, but because the debtor failed to perform under the terms of the 
contract. If the debtor had instead continued to perform under the contract, there 
would be no damages and the creditor would not have a claim against the estate, 
notwithstanding the trustee's "rejection". The language of § 365(g)(1) simply creates the 
fiction that whenever the breach occurs, it will be deemed to be effective as of the date 
of filing. 
C. § 365 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE DOES NOT GIVE A CHAPTER 7 
TRUSTEE THE POWER TO REPUDIATE THE DEBTOR'S EXECUTORY 
CONTRACTS. 
Case law is replete with examples of debtors who are seeking to escape the 
obligations of their contracts, both executory and executed. And the Bankruptcy Code 
allows debtors to accomplish this by granting them a discharge. But where the debtor 
cm\0715 
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wishes to perform, as in the instant case, the Bankruptcy Code does not provide an 
excuse for the non-debtor party to breach the contract. 
In the case of In Re Knight 8 B.R. 925 (1981), the Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Maryland was faced with a similar situation where the Chapter 7 trustee did 
not assume the debtor's residential lease. The court considered the specific language of 
§365(g)(l) stating that the trustee's rejection of a lease was deemed to be a breach of 
the lease as of the date of the filing of the petition. The Court considered several 
interpretations of this language and determined that the trustee's rejection did not 
constitute a termination of the lease that would justify the landlord's nonperformance. 
"[Such a reading] would adopt a policy that allows a landlord to evict tenants 
regardless of default solely on the basis that the tenant has sought relief under the 
Code. Such an inequitable result could not have been intended." Id at 929. The court 
held that the landlord could not treat the lease as breached by the debtor based solely 
on the trustee's rejection. 
The breach described in subsection (g)(1) is deemed a breach for the sole 
purpose of allowing the non-debtor party to the contract the legal opportunity to assert 
a claim against the estate. Such a rejection is not a cancellation of the contract and the 
non-debtor party must continue to honor the contract unless the debtor actually 
commits a breach of the lease or contract 
Similarly, where the debtor has pledged his rights under a lease, the trustee's 
rejection of the lease does not destroy the underlying leasehold estate. The rejection 
cm\P71591 
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merely puts the lease and its performance outside of the bankruptcy administration. In 
re Garfinkle. 577 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1978). 
Bankruptcy law does not give a trustee the power to repudiate contracts. The 
trustee only has the ability to determine whether the estate should become liable under 
the terms of the contract in order to accede to its benefits. And bankruptcy law 
certainly does not give a non-debtor party to a contract the right to treat a contract as 
breached simply because the debtor has filed a petition. 
The concepts set forth above include a general summary of the analysis 
contained in an article entitled "Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding 
'Rejection'", 59 U. Colo. L. Rev. 845 (1988), a thoughtful commentary on § 365, its 
history and application. Many of the ideas espoused in this Brief have been liberally 
borrowed from the article and counsel acknowledges said contribution as an important 
source fo the work herein. 
Allowing the District Court's construction of the statutory language to prevail 
would result in a grave injustice and would stand on its ear the bankruptcy policy of a 
fresh start for the debtor. If the non-debtor party to a contract or lease can treat the 
agreement as terminated regardless of the debtor's actual conduct, all debtors will be in 
jeopardy of losing their jobs and possibly their homes. 
The Knight case illustrates the potential problem involved where a debtor has 
a residential lease of an apartment. In such a situation, there is no reason for a trustee 
to assume the lease because there could be no benefit to the estate. But can the 
landlord treat the lease as terminated upon the trustee's rejection when the tenant is in 
-18-
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compliance with the terms of the lease? Can the landlord evict the tenant based upon 
nothing more than a bankruptcy filing? The answer must be "No". 
Unless the District Court decision is overturned, the same skewed result 
occurs in the employment arena. Obviously, a Chapter 7 trustee would not assume a 
debtor's employment contract. In most cases, he would be prohibited from doing 
because § 365(c) prohibits the assumption of personal service contracts. So if the 
trustee took no action, § 365(d)(1) would deem the contract rejected. To follow the 
lower court's reasoning to its logical conclusion, an employer could then refuse to pay 
an employee who had continued to work after filing bankruptcy asserting that the 
employment contract had been automatically severed by the filing of the bankruptcy 
case and the trustee's rejection. Such a result could never have been intended by the 
drafters of the Bankruptcy Code. In fact, such a result contravenes the proscription of § 
525(b) which prohibits discrimination by a private employer because of an employee's 
bankruptcy filing. 
In the instant case, the Consulting Agreement was an employment contract 
between Cobabe and Stangers. Even though Cobabe was denominated as an 
independent contractor and not legally an employee, the contract provided Cobabe with 
his only source of employment To allow Stangers to repudiate their obligations under 
the Agreement when there has been absolutely no breach on the part of Cobabe flies in 
the face of reason and equity. Section 365 does not require such a result and this Court 
should not torture the statutory interpretation to reach such a result 
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CONCLUSION 
The Agreement for Consulting Services entered into by Cobabe and Stangers 
is an enforceable contract. Cobabe has never breached the terms of the contract and 
has at all times been ready, willing and able to perform his duties under the contract. 
The Chapter 7 Trustee's refusal to assume the contract as property of the bankruptcy 
estate has no impact upon the parties' rights and obligations under the contract. 
The rejection by the trustee constitutes a breach of the agreement only for the 
purpose of allowing Stangers to make a claim against the estate, if at any time Stangers 
may have a claim to assert. 
Section 365 does not give a trustee the power to terminate a contract. 
However, the District Court's decision enables a trustee to repudiate a debtor's 
executory contract regardless of the debtor's conduct. In this case, such a decision 
allows Stangers to breach the contract with impunity and leaves Cobabe without a 
remedy for such breach. Such a result is contrary to law and equity. For these reasons, 
this Court should reverse the decision of the District Court and enforce the terms of the 
contract between the parties. 
DATED this of July, 1991. 
wnery 
of and fc 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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July, 1991. 
William T. Thurman, Esq. 
McKay, Burton & Thurman 
10 East South Temple, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
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Tab A 
AGREEMENT FOR CONSULTING SERVICES 
This Agreement is made this day of April, 1988 
between Garth Stanger and Edward Stanger ("Stanger") and H. 
LeRoy Cobabe ("Consultant"). 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Stanger is currently in the business of 
buying and selling automobiles and is desirous of operating a 
dealership located in St. George, Utah and is also desirous of 
entering into a Dealer Agreement with Toyota Motor 
Distributors, Inc. ("Toyota") and 
WHEREAS, Consultant has extensive experience in the 
area of buying and selling automobiles, as well as operating 
and managing a dealership, and 
WHEREAS, Stanger desires to have Consultant provide 
services including assistance in entering into a Dealer 
Agreement with Toyota and assistance and advice in operating, 
maintaining and managing the St. George dealership, and 
WHEREAS, Consultant agrees to perform these services 
under the terms and conditions set forth below; 
THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises set 
forth herein, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
1. Consultant will perform consulting and advisory 
services on behalf of Stanger with respect to all matters 
relating to or affecting Stanger's acquisition of a Dealer 
Agreement with Toyota and Stanger's operation of a car 
dealership in St. George. 
2. Consultant's services will be rendered largely in 
St. George, Utah, but Consultant will, on request, perform 
services at such other places as required or as designated by 
Stanger. 
3. In the performance of the services, the hours 
Consultant is to work on any given day will be entirely within 
Consultant's control and Stanger will rely upon Consultant to 
put in such number of hours as is reasonably necessary to 
fulfill the spirit and purpose of this agreement. 
4. Stanger agrees to pay Consultant the sum of 
$10,000.00 upon the execution of this Agreement for services 
performed to date. Stanger shall then pay to Consultant a 
monthly salary of $4,000.00 beginning on May 1, 1988 and 
continuing on the first day of each month thereafter until 
September 1, 1988, when Stanger shall pay to Consultant 
$13,000.00. Thereafter, Stanger shall pay to Consultant 
$4,000.00 on the first day of each and every month until May 
31, 1991, at which time this Agreement shall terminate. 
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5. This Agreement provides for the performance of 
services by Consultant as an independent contractor. Nothing 
in this Agreement shall be in any way construed to be 
inconsistent with this relationship or status. 
6. Consultant agrees to hold Stanger harmless from 
any and all liability for withholding state or federal income 
tax, state or federal industrial accident contributions and any 
employees tax liability now or subsequently imposed on Stanger. 
7. Nothing contained herein shall limit Consultant's 
right to enter into other employment agreements provided that 
the work to be performed under such other agreements shall not 
conflict with Consultant's duties under this Agreement. 
8. Stanger's obligation to make monthly payments as 
set forth in this Agreement shall terminate upon Toyota's 
refusal to enter into a Dealer Agreement with Stanger. 
9. The entire agreement between the parties with 
respect to the subject matter herein is contained in this 
Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement are solely for the 
benefit of the parties hereto and not for the benefit of any 
other person, persons or entities. 
10. No waiver, alteration or modification of any of 
the provisions of this Agreement shall be binding unless in 
writing and signed by the parties hereto. 
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11. All notices and communi 
cations regarding this 
Ag reement shall be se 
nt to the parties as follows: 
Garth Stanger 
Edward Stanger 
3655 Lupin Way 
St. George, Utah 84770 
^02ies°oyuthObvaaieiey View Drive, #116 
St. George, Utah 84770 
12. This Agreement shall be gove 
the State of Utah. 
DATED this 
rn 
ed by the laws of 
day of , 1988. 
Garth Stanger 
Edward Stanger 
H. LeRoy Cobabe 
6521m 
? V 7 ^ Un.'S S ^ B«.K,up«y CouM 
Attest: , J 
v l - < 
Deputy ClerK 
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TabB 
I!' THE CISTPICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
H. LeROY COBABE, 
vs. 
GARTH STANGER and 
EDWARD STANGER, 
Plaintiff, ) MEMORANDUM DECISION 
) Civil No. 900503248 
Defendants. 
This matter came before the Court on October 18, 1990, 
the Honorable J. Philip Eves presiding, en cross Motions for 
Summary Judgment. The Plaintiffs were represented by Carolyn 
Montgomery, their attorney of record and the Defendants by Joel T. 
Marker, their attorney of record. The Court heard extensive oral 
argument and then took the matter under submission. The Court has 
now reviewed the file in its entirety including the article 
entitled Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding 
"Rejection", by Michael T. Andrew which was submitted by Plaintiff 
and the copies of statutes and cases cited in opposition to the 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment submitted by counsel for 
the defense. The Court being fully advisee in the premises now 
enters the following Decision and Order. 
This case places this Court in a rather unusual position 
of being required to decide a hotly disputed issue of Federal 
Bankruptcy Law which is really the only legal issue presented by 
either side in their Motions for Summary Judgment. A brief 
explanation of the facts would appear appropriate. These are the 
facts to which the parties have agreed there is no dispute. 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
On or about April 26th, 1988, the parties entered into 
an agreement for consulting services, (the agreement), wherein the 
Plaintiff agreed to act as consultant for the Defendants who were 
purchasing a Toyota dealership from the Plaintiff. The agreement 
contained provisions for compensation to the Plaintiff from the 
Defendants. Both sides kept up their obligations under the 
agreement through the month of October, 1989. On November 1, 
1989, the Plaintiff filed bankruptcy in response to a Writ of 
Garnishment which was served on the Defendants by a prevailing 
party in another lawsuit with the Plaintiff therein seeking to 
garnish the payments due from these Defendants to this Plaintiff. 
Thereafter, these Defendants refused to make any more payrents 
under the agreement with this Plaintiff and the matter wound up 
before the Federal Bankruptcy Court on a Motion to determine the 
validity of the garnishment. 
After hearing, the Bankruptcy Court ordered that the 
garnishment had no validity as it was attempting to garnish 
post-petition earnings. The Bankruptcy Court ordered the 
Defendants to pay to this Plaintiff some $20,000.00 in overdue 
payments under the agreement or to be found in contempt of court 
with stated penalties. A payment of $20,300.00 was made to 
Plaintiff by Defendants under that order. 
Thereafter, on stipulation of both sides, the Order of 
the Bankruptcy Court was vacated and the enforcement of the 
consulting agreement between this Plaintiff and these Defendants 
became the subject of a Complaint before this Court on April 23, 
1990. The Plaintiff's Complaint states simply that there is an 
agreement between himself and the Defendants, that he is entitled 
to payment under that agreement, that the Defendants have failed 
and refused to pay as required under the agreement. The Plaintiff 
seeks Judgment for the amounts due under the agreement. To that 
Complaint the Defendants have filed an Answer and asserted a 
Counterclaim. The issue raised by the Answer and Counterclaim is 
the issue which this Court must resolve in this decision, mainly 
whether or not the agreement between the parties has any further 
force or effect between these oarties. 
The parties agree for purposes of this decision that the 
agreement is in fact an executory contract within the meaning of 
the bankruptcy lawsf that is was net assumed within 60 days of the 
petition date by the trustee in bankruptcy, that by operation of 
law the nonassumption meant that the contract had been rejected by 
the trustee in bankruptcy, and that the Bankruptcy Court did not 
rule on the issue of the effect of that rejection upon the rights 
and obligations of these parties to the contract, under 11 U.S.C., 
Section 365 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. 
LEGAL ISSUE 
The issue upon which the resolution of these Motions for 
Summary Judgment turns is the effect of the rejection of the 
executory contract by the trustee in bankruptcy. Plaintiff 
contends that such a rejection is merely a decision by the 
bankruptcy trustee not to include the executory contract as an 
asset (with a corresponding liability) in the estate of the 
bankrupt. Plaintiff contends further that the effect of the 
rejection by the trustee is simply to leave the parties in the 
position they were in prior to the rejection and thus seeks to 
enforce the agreement. Plaintiff contends he remains ready, 
willing and able to perform consulting services and has never 
breached the agreement. Defendants contend that the rejection by 
the trustee in bankruptcy has the effect, as a natter of law, of 
terminating their obligations to perform under the contract. 
Defendants cite 11 U.S.C. Section 365 for the proposition that the 
rejection by the trustee constitutes a breach of the contract and 
ends their obligations and rights thereunder except their right to 
file a claim for damages with the trustee. They assert therefore 
in their Answer and Counterclaim that the contract is of no 
further force and effect and Plaintiff has no right to pursue 
payments under the agreement. 
ANALYSIS 
In support of Plaintiff's position counsel has referred 
the Court to several cases and to the article by Michael T. Andrew 
referred to above. None of the cases appear dispositive of the 
issue as it is apparent by the cases cited by the parties as well 
as the cases cited by Mr. Andrew in his article that there is a 
longstanding dispute among the Federal Judges as to the exact 
effect of a rejection of an executory contract by a trustee in 
bankruptcy. Mr. Andrew, and the Plaintiff, contend the Federal 
Courts has erred in their interpretation of 11 U.S.C, 365. There 
are cases cited by both sides which appear to support their 
respective positions to some extent. None of the cases cited 
appear to be factually similar to this case. (See In Re Knight, 3 
B.R. 925 [1981] and In Re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2nd 
1339 [1983]). 
The Court is substantially persuaded by the article by 
Mr. Andrew cited hereinabove that the doctrine of rejection of an 
executory contract by a trustee did not originally include the 
concept that the debtor and the non-debtor party to the contract 
would have their rights and liabilities thereunder automatically 
terminated by the rejection. The Court is further substantially 
persuaded that it was not the original intent to the Courts 
involved in the development of the concept of rejection that the 
statutory breach language contained in the present bankruptcy code 
would somehow operate to terminate those rights and liabilities. 
In fact, the arguments and policy considerations stated by Mr. 
Andrew appear to make perfect sense to this Court. However, this 
Court is obligated to apply Federal Bankruptcy Law as it has been 
interpreted by the Federal Courts to the best of its ability 
rather than to apply a novel interpretation of that law in this 
case. This does not appear to be a case of first impression and 
therefore this Court must follow Federal decisions. 
In two cases the Federal Courts have apparently held 
that rejection of an executory contract by a trustee in bankruptcy 
has the effect of terminating the liabilities under the contract 
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